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Civil Procedure 
by Jack H. Friedenthal* 
No one of my honest opinions, in fact, is adapted 
to my popularity in Glathion, because I am a mon-
strous clever fellow who does justice to things as they 
are. 
Therefore, I must remember always, in justice to my-
self, that I very probably hold traffic with madmen. 
Yet Rome was a fine town, and it was geese who 
saved it. These people may be right; and certainly 
I cannot go so far as to say they are wrong: but still, 
at the same time-! Yes, that is how I feel about it. 
J ames Branch Cabell, Jurgen 
* A.B. 1953, Stanford University. The author extends his appreciation 
LL.B. Harvard Law School. Professor to Andrew G. Pearl, student at Golden 
of Law, Stanford University School of Gate College, School of Law, for as-
Law. Member, California State Bar. sistance in preparation of this article. 
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New Trial-Specification of Grounds and Reasons 
In 1965 the legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure l 
section 657, which concerns the procedure for granting a new 
trial. In Mercer v. Perez2 and Treber v. Superior Court3 the 
supreme court interpreted the new provisions and attempted 
to clarify them.4 Subsequently, a number of related cases 
were decided in the courts of appeal. Together these cases 
involve important changes in the practice regarding new trials. 
The major alteration of section 657 was the addition of a 
requirement that the court specify its reasons for granting a 
1. All further statutory references, 
unless otherwise specified, are to Cal. 
Code of Civ. Pro. 
2.68 Cal.2d 104,65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 
436 P.2d 315 (1968). 
3. 68 C i1.2d J 28, 65 Cal. Rptr. 330. 
436 P.2d 330 (1968), 
4. The amended provisions of CCP 
§ 657 read as follows: 
"When a new trial is granted, on all 
or part of the issues. the court shall 
specify the ground or grounds upon 
which it is granted and the court's 
reason or reasons for granting the new 
trial upon each ground stated, 
"A new trial shall not be granted 
upon the ground of insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, /lor UpOII the grou/ld of ex-
cessil'e or illadequate damages, unless 
after weighing the evidence the court 
is convinced from the entire record, in-
cluding reasonable inferences therefrom, 
that the court or jury clearly should 
have reached a different verdict or de-
cision. 
"The order passing upon and deter-
mining the motion must be made and 
entered as provided in Section 660 and 
if the motion is granted must state the 
ground or grounds relied upon by the 
court, and may contain the specifica-
tion of reasons, If an order granting 
such motion does not contain such 
specification of reasons, the court must, 
192 CAL LAW 1969 
within 10 days after filing such order, 
prepare, sign and file such specification 
of reasons in writing with the clerk, 
The court shall not direct the attorney 
for a party to prepare either or both 
said order and said specification of 
reasons, 
"On appeal from an order granting a 
new trial the order shall be affirmed if 
it should have been granted upon any 
ground stated in the motion, whether 
or not specified in the order or specifica-
tion of reasons ':' * *, except that 
(a) the order shall not be affirmed upon 
the ground of insufficiency of the evi-
dence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or UpOII the ground of ex-
cessil'e or illadequate damages, unless 
such ground is stated in the order 
granting the motion * * ':' and (b) 
on appeal from an order granting a 
new trial upon the ground of the in-
sufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or upon 
the ground of excessive * * * or 
inadequate damages. it shall be conclu-
sively presumed that said order as to 
such ground was made only for the 
reasons specified in said order or said 
specification of reasons, and such order 
shall be reversed as to such ground 
only if there is no substantial basis in 
the record for any such reasons." 
(As amended Cal. Stats, 1965, ch, 1749, 
§ 1: Cal. Stats, 1967, ch. 72, § 1.) 
2
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new trial. This raised the primary question: What are suf-
ficient specifications within the meaning of the statute? In 
pursuing this inquiry, it is necessary to consider what has been 
held to satisfy an already existing requirement, that of specify-
ing the grounds on which a new trial order is based. 
The Requirement of Stating the Grounds on which the 
Grant of a New Trial is Based 
In 1919 section 657 was amended to add a provision requir-
ing that whenever a trial court granted a new trial based on 
the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict the 
court had to specify, in its order, that ground as the one upon 
which the new trial was granted. While the requirement ap-
pears to be clear, trial courts often failed to make the necessary 
specifications. The statute provided further than unless such 
ground was specified it would be "conclusively presumed" 
that the granting of the new trial was not based on such 
ground. The courts were liberal, however, in finding sufficient 
specification in the language of the new trial order. If the 
language was susceptible of an interpretation showing an intent 
to include insufficiency of the evidence as one of the grounds, 
it was generally so interpreted. Finally, in Aced v. Hobbs-
Sesack Plumbing Co. 5 the supreme court held that this liberal 
position was improper; the specification must be made directly 
or be directly inferable. 
The Aced decision was not as harsh as it might appear. The 
court expressly did not disapprove those decisions upholding 
specifications in the following situations: when the trial court 
said no more than that it based its decision on "all the grounds 
stated in the motion," and insufficiency was one of the grounds 
stated; when no specification was made, but the moving party 
put only the ground of insufficiency of the evidence in his 
motion; or when the court could directly infer from the lan-
guage of the motion that the ground was insufficiency of the 
evidence (for example, when held to be based on the inad-
equacy of damages). In 1966, five years after Aced, the 
5. 55 Cal.2d 573, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 
360 P.2d 897 (1961). 
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court, faced with another apparently inadequate order for new 
trial, held that the specification of grounds would be inade-
quate only when no legitimate direct inference is possible.6 
The 1965 amendment to section 657 continues the require-
ment that the grounds be specified, but extends it to all grounds 
upon which the motion is granted. 7 In Mercer v. Perel the 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted after a jury 
verdict had been rendered for defendants: 
"The motion for a new trial is granted. The court is of 
the definite opinion, after analyzing the evidence in this 
case, that there has been a definite miscarriage of justice. 
The court is of the opinion that the jury trying this case 
should have rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs and 
against the defendants."9 
On appeal from the judgment defendants claimed that the 
order failed to specify the grounds for the decision. Citing 
Malkasian v. Irwin 10 and lee-Kist Packing Co. v. 1. F. Sloan 
CO .. ,l1 the court held that, since the motion itself was pred-
icated solely upon insufficiency of the evidence and since the 
motion could be granted only upon a ground alleged in the 
motion, an inference satisfying the specification requirement 
could be drawn that the insufficiency of the evidence was the 
ground upon which the court had acted. 
The Requirement of Specifying the Reasons for Granting 
a New Trial on the Grounds Stated 
Defendants in Mercer also claimed that the new require-
ment of the specification of reasons for the grant of a new 
trial had not been complied with. This claim raised the 
questions of how far the court would go in inferring the 
6. Frantz v. McLaughlin, 64 Cal.2d 
622, 51 Cal. Rptr. 282, 414 P.2d 410 
(1966). But cf. Malkasian v. Irwin, 61 
Cal.2d 738, 40 Cal. Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 
822 (1964). 
7. As amended Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 
1749, § 1; Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 72, § 1. 
See footnote 4, page 192. 
194 CAL LAW 1969 
8. 68 Cal.2d 104, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 
436 P.2d 315 (1968). 
9. 68 Cal.2d at 108, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 317, 436 P.2d at 317. 
10. 61 Cal.2d 738, 40 Cal. Rptr. 78, 
394 P.2d 822 (1964). 
11. 157 Cal. App.2d 695, 321 P.2d 
840 (1958). 
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reasons for the grant of a new trial and would it take the 
same approach it had taken on specification of grounds.12 
The court pointed out that there are two reasons for the new 
provision. The first is to require trial judges, rarely overruled 
when they grant new trials, to reflect seriously before making 
their decisions. The second is to assist the appellate court 
in reviewing the propriety of the grant of a new trial, partic-
ularly when based on the insufficiency of evidence. Prior 
to the amendment, an appellant challenging the grant of a 
new trial was required to show that the whole record did not 
justify a new trial. A court of appeal was usually put in the 
position of searching the entire record for evidence upon 
which it could justify the decision below. If it found such 
evidence it would have to uphold the grant of the new trial, 
though it might be relying on evidentiary matters the trial 
court had not relied on and, indeed, had not found sufficient 
to warrant a new trial. The appellate court could not devote 
its attention, as it should, to those items upon which the 
trial court had based its decision. 
In effectuating the purposes of the new provision, the 
supreme court in Mercer took what may be considered a 
"hard line," stating that it would not infer from the record 
the reasons for the decision. Plaintiff, the respondent, argued 
that since defendants pleaded no affirmative defenses, the only 
issues decided by the jury were that the defendants were 
negligent and that their negligence was the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries. Since those were the only issues, he 
contended, it must be inferred that the lower court reasoned 
that the evidence showed defendants to be negligent and that 
their negligence W$lS the proximate cause of the injuries. In 
refusing to accept this argument, the court cited the Aced 
case and proposed that, since Aced had disapproved of a sim-
ilar inference with regard to the specification of grounds, it 
12. It should be made clear that at 
this point we are dealing primarily with 
the ground of insufficiency of the evi-
dence and the reasons therefor. In-
sufficiency is the only ground which if 
not stated results in a presumption that 
it is not the ground relied on. Further-
more, with respect to such ground, it 
is presumed that the only reasons relied 
upon are those specified in the order. 
See last paragraph CCP § 657. 
CAL LAW 1969 195 
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was "not disposed to adopt a contrary rule with respect to 
the reasons for those grounds."13 There is no question that 
the court was taking a "harder line" with reasons than it 
had with grounds, considering the limitations and concessions 
in the Aced decision.14 In light of the purposes of the new 
provision, the decision to take a "harder line" regarding rea-
sons seems appropriate. It is possible that the trial judge 
based his decision on a reason totally outside those which 
plaintiff claimed were the only ones that could be inferred. 
Thus, the trial court may have been totally incorrect in grant-
ing a new trial; the assumption that the judge must have made 
a decision on appropriate reasons is not warranted.15 
After deciding that direct specification is required, the court 
had to determine just how detailed the specification must be. 
It attempted to lay down standards in the following language: 
No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the content 
of such a specification, and it will necessarily vary accord-
ing to the facts and circumstances of each case. For 
example, if the ground is "irregularity in the proceedings" 
caused by counsel's referring to insurance, the judge 
should state that the reason for his ruling was the mis-
conduct of counsel in making such reference; if the ground 
is "misconduct of the jury" through their resorting to 
chance, the judge should specify this improper method 
of deliberation as the basis of his action; if the ground 
is that the decision is "against the law" because of a 
failure to find on a material issue, the judge should so 
state and should identify that issue. And to give full 
effect to the new scope of review provided in the fourth 
paragraph of the 1965 amendments, discussed herein-
above, we hold that if the ground relied upon is "insuffi-
ciency of the evidence" the judge must briefly recite the 
respects in which he finds the evidence to be legally 
13. 68 Cal.2d at 117, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 323, 436 P.2d at 323. 
14. Indeed, the decision in Mercer 
itself, holding the ground but not the 
reasons to be sufficiently specified, 
illustrates this point. 
196 CAL LAW 1969 
15. Of course, neither is the assump-
tion made in the Mercer case as to 
grounds warranted; it is possible the 
judge erroneously went off on an error 
of law not mentioned in the motion. 
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inadequate; no other construction is consonant with the 
conclusive presumption on appeal that the order was 
made "only for the reasons specified" such an 
order must briefly identify the portion of the record which 
convinces the judge "that the court or jury clearly should 
have reached a different verdict or decision."16 (Empha-
sis added.) 
That this language did not solve all interpretation problems 
may be inferred from the number of cases arising in the courts 
of appeal attempting to ascertain the sufficiency of the trial 
court's specification of reasons. The element of the Mercer 
opinion causing difficulty was the requirement that the court 
"briefly identify the portion of the record" showing that the 
evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict. In Kincaid v. 
Sears Roebuck & CO.17 the court of appeal held that the 
language of Mercer did not require the trial judge to "cite 
page and line of the record, or discuss the testimony of partic-
ular witnesses, but instead he need only point out the partic-
ular 'deficiency' of the prevailing parties' case which convinces 
him the judgment should not stand. This accomplishes the 
purpose of the statute by enabling a reviewing court to 'deter-
mine if there is a substantial basis for finding such a defi-
ciency.' "18 Funderburk v. General Telephone CO. 19 and Mat-
lock v. Farmers Mercantile Co. 20 contain similar language. 
These cases further held that if the trial judge states his reasons 
for granting a new trial in terms of ultimate facts, he satisfies 
the requirements of the statute. Thus, if he states that the evi-
dence is insufficient to justify a finding of negligence, insuffi-
cient to justify a finding of damages, or insufficient to permit 
a finding of contributory negligence, he satisfies the require-
ments of the statute. 1 
16. 68 Cal.2d at 115-116, 65 Cal. 19. 262 Cal. App.2d 869. 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 322, 436 P.2d at 322. Rptr. 275 (1968). 
17. 259 Cal. App.2d 733, 66 Cal. 20. 258 Cal. App.2d 362. 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 915 (1968). Rptr. 723 (1968). 
18. 259 Cal. App.2d 733 at 738, 66 1. Actually the opinion in Kincaid 
Cal. Rptr. 915 at 918 (1968). went even further, stating that if would 
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This standard for specificity seems clearly correct. It 
serves the purposes for which the requirement of specifica-
tion of reasons was put into the code. If a new trial is 
granted on the basis of lack of evidence to support a material 
point, it is impossible to designate where the record shows lack 
of evidence. Even if the new trial is based on the weight of the 
evidence showing the existence of a material point obviously 
not accepted by the jury, it is extremely difficult to point to 
each item in the record bearing on the issue and to discuss 
its particular impact on the trial court's decision. As the court 
in Kincaid stated, "It would be unreasonable to infer a stat-
utory intent that the court's stated reasons embrace a discus-
sion of the weight to be given, and the inferences to be drawn 
from each item of evidence supporting, or impeaching, the 
judgment."2 When a new trial is granted on the basis of in-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the court of 
appeal has to peruse the entire record for evidence (or the 
lack thereof) regarding the particular fact in question. 
In McLaughlin v. City and County of San Francisco, 3 
plaintiff, a passenger on a cable car, was injured when the 
car stopped suddenly. Defendant admitted liability and the 
case was tried solely on the issue of damages. After a jury 
verdict for $8,117.50, the trial court granted a new trial 
conditioned upon plaintiff's refusal to accept a remittitur. 
The order read as follows: 
This order granting a New Trial is based upon the 
failure of the Plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence reasonable total damages, both general and 
special above the said amount of Five Thousand One 
Hundred and Seventeen Dollars and Fifty Cents ($5,-
117.50) . It is further ordered that if such waiver is filed 
then said Motion of a New Trial shall stand Denied; 
be sufficient for the trial court simply 
to specify that "the defendant was not 
negligent" or "the defendant's negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries." 
198 CAL LAW 1969 
2. 259 Cal. App.2d at 739, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. at 919. 
3. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
782 (1968). 
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otherwise said Motion shall stand granted upon the 
ground hereinabove stated.4 (Emphasis added.) 
Although the appellate court in McLaughlin cited with ap-
proval Matlock, Kincaid and Funderburk, it nevertheless held 
that the specification of reasons was inadequate. The court 
took the position that the trial court should have done more 
to show which items of special and general damages were 
involved in its determination. The court believed it was 
somehow improper that, damages being the only issue in-
volved, both the grounds and the reasons given for the decision 
were the same. It failed to recognize that under the Aced 
and Mercer cases it is clear that the grounds may be inferred 
from the reasons when there is only one issue at stake. Clearly, 
the reasons in this case were appropriately stated, and the 
grounds, it would seem, could justifiably be inferred. While 
the trial judge could be required to state just what items 
of special damages he thought improper and the extent of 
general damages which he thought possible, such a require-
ment seems unnecessarily restrictive and burdensome. It is 
obvious that the supreme court will have to augment its 
opinion in Mercer so that trial judges will know precisely 
what their duties are. s 
The Effect of Failure to Specify Reasons 
The most controversial part of the Mercer opinion is the 
decision as to what happens when the specification is inade-
quate. The problem is complex and can be understood only 
after a thorough reading of the last paragraph of section 657.6 
This paragraph makes it clear that the grant of a new trial 
will not be sustained on appeal on the ground of insufficiency 
of the evidence unless such ground is stated and that it will 
be conclusively presumed that the only reasons for granting 
the new trial on that ground are those reasons stated in the 
order. It follows then: If no reasons are stated in the order, 
4. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. supreme court denied hearings in both 
Rptr. at 783. Kincaid and Matlock. 
5. It is interesting to note that the 6. The statute is set out on page 
192, at footnote 4. 
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the new trial cannot be sustained on the insufficiency of the 
evidence. The question becomes, when no reasons are found, 
should the appellate court reinstate the original verdict or send 
the case back to the trial judge and permit him to insert his 
reasons for granting the new trial? 
In the next to last paragraph of section 657 it is stated, 
"[I]f an order granting such motion does not contain such 
specification of reasons, the court must, within 1 0 days after 
filing such order, prepare, sign and file such specification of 
reasons in writing with the clerk. The court shall not direct 
the attorney for a party to prepare either or both said order 
and said specification of reasons." The supreme court in 
Mercer interpreted these words to provide an absolute 1 O-day 
limit on the power of the trial judge to specify his reasons, 
thus, as a practical matter, making it impossible for him to 
do so after an appeal. After 10 days have run, said the 
supreme court, the trial court has no jurisdiction to specify 
reasons. 
The history of section 657 gives strong support to the 
supreme court's conclusion. Prior to the 1965 amendments 
the statute provided that any required specification of grounds 
had to be made within 10 days after granting the order; failure 
to do so resulted in a conclusive presumption that the order 
was not based on such ground. Under this provision it was 
held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make such 
a specification once 10 days had elapsed. 7 By imposing a 
10-day limitation regarding the specification of reasons with 
language similar to the prior requirement for specifying 
grounds, the 1965 amendment clearly indicates that the legis-
lature intended the new provision to be interpreted in the 
same way as the old one. Furthermore, as the court in 
Mercer pointed out, the policy of the 1965 amendments would 
be thwarted if the appellate court could order the case to 
be returned for the trial judge to add a few words to his orig-
inal order. The trial court would not be disposed to take 
7. Frantz v. McLaughlin, 64 Cal.2d 
622, 51 Cal. Rptr. 282, 414 P.2d 410 
(1966). 
200 CAL LAW 1969 
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the same requisite care to make certain that it has specified 
its reasons as it would when failure to do so renders its grant 
of a new trial void. Moreover, a successful moving party, 
not wanting to lose a new trial, is given incentive to urge 
the judge to comply with the statute. Finally, the Mercer 
decision avoids the double appeal that would occur if, in every 
situation where specifications are improper, the case is re-
manded to the trial court for a statement of reasons, then 
returned to the appellate court for a decision on the merits 
of the new trial grant. 
The problem with the Mercer ruling is that a litigant who 
has obtained a new trial is at the mercy of a trial judge who 
fails in his duty to make the proper specifications. The re-
versal of a new trial order is a serious price to pay for proce-
dural regulation when the reversal causes the initial judgment 
to stand, no matter how inadequate or unfair, and when the 
successful moving party is helpless to make the trial judge 
do his proper job. 
The problem is particularly acute in those cases decided 
by the trial judge before the Mercer opinion was written. In 
light of the liberal attitude the court had previously taken 
with respect to the specification of grounds, many trial judges 
and litigants may be caught unaware. The courts might 
ameliorate this situation by following the analogy of the Aced 
decision, which held that stringent rules regarding grounds 
should be applied prospectively. In Aced the court said, 
"While it is true that ordinarily an overruling decision is 
deemed to state what the law was from the beginning and is 
therefore generally given retroactive effect, an exception has 
been applied in several instances with respect to procedural 
matters."8 Even though the specification of grounds in that 
case was clearly inadequate, the court upheld it to avoid un-
fairness to the party for whom the new trial had been granted. 
The courts in the current cases involving the 1965 amendments 
to section 657 could be similarly lenient in determining what 
is a sufficient specification of reasons, and thus avoid the 
8. 55 Ca1.2d at 580, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 
260, 360 P.2d at 900. 
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drastic effect of the ten-day rule, at least in those cases decided 
by the trial court prior to the Mercer decision. 
Until now, most cases have given a sufficiently broad in-
terpretation of the requirement of specification of reasons 
to hold the trial court's specification adequate. In those 
cases in which the trial court's specification has been held 
insufficient, the courts have found special means for per-
mitting the new trial. In Mercer, for example, the court 
did not have to face the ultimate consequences of a reversal 
of the new trial order. Plaintiff had cross-appealed on the 
ground that the trial judge had erred in giving instructions. 
After reversing the order granting plaintiff a new trial, the 
supreme court went on to reverse the "reinstated" judgment 
on the cross-appeaP I 
A means of avoiding the effect of the Mercer decision, 
resulting from insufficient specification, is discussed in Treber I 
v. Superior Court,I° a companion case to Mercer. The trial 
court's order stated, "Motion for new trial granted-errors in 
law."ll Petitioner, who had received a jury verdict at trial, 
sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate the 
new trial order because no reasons had been specified. The 
supreme court denied the writ, pointing out that the first 
clause of the last paragraph of section 657 reads as follows: 
"On appeal from an order granting a new trial the order shall 
be affirmed if it should have been granted upon any ground 
stated in the motion, whether or not specified in the order or 
specification of reasons .... "12 The Mercer case dealt with 
the special exception to this rule which applies only when 
insufficiency of the evidence is to be considered as a ground on 
appeal and no reasons are given for granting the motion on 
9. Ironically, the court gave "con-
siderable weight" to the fact that the 
trial judge, in ruling on the motion for 
new trial, had stated that there had 
been a definite miscarriage of justice. 
10. 68 Cal.2d 128,65 Cal. Rptr. 330, 
436 P.2d 330 (1968). 
202 CAL LAW 1969 
11. 68 Cal.2d at 130, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 332, 436 P.2d at 332. 
12. The "or specification of reasons" 
refers to the situation where at the 
time of the order no reasons are speci-
fied and within 10 days such specifica-
tion of reasons of filed in a document 
that makes no mention of grounds. 
12
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that ground. 13 Therefore, even though the appellate court 
must reverse a new trial granted on the basis of insufficiency 
of the evidence when that ground is not specified in the order 
(or directly inferable) or when the reasons for the grant on that 
ground are not specified, it not only can, but must, search the 
record to see whether or not the grant of a new trial should 
be upheld on any other ground set forth in the motion for a 
new trial. This is true even if the trial court did not mention 
the ground or contemplate it as a basis for a new trial. 
Thus it was held in Treber, when the trial court specified no 
reasons at all, the writ of mandate was inappropriate since the 
order might be valid. As the court in Treber stated, "It 
follows that a failure of the trial judge to specify any ground-
and a fortiori any reason for a ground actually stated-can-
not be held to render the order void from its inception. The 
reviewing court remains under an express statutory duty to 
affirm such an order if the record will support any ground 
listed in the motion."14 
In Byers v. Board of SupervisorsI6 the trial judge granted a 
motion for a new trial on two grounds: (a) that the evidence 
was insufficient to justify the decision and (b) that the decision 
was against the law. Finding that the reasons for the de-
cision were filed sixteen days after the order was granted, the 
court of appeal, following Treber, held that it could not uphold 
the order on the ground of insufficiency, but could and did 
uphold it on the ground that the decision was against the 
law. 
There are three cases in which the courts of appeal reversed 
the grant of a new trial where the reasons were never specified 
or were specified after the ten-day limit, and the only ground 
that could justify a new trial was insufficiency of evidence.16 
13. The statute is set out on page 
192, at footnote 4. 
14. 68 Cal.2d at 134, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 334, 436 P.2d at 334. 
15. 262 Cal. App.2d 148, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 549 (1968). For further discus-
sion of this case, see McKinstry, STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this 
volume. 
16. Brooks v. Harootunian, 261 Cal. 
App.2d 680, 68 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1968); 
Higson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
263 Cal. App.2d 333, 69 Cal. Rptr. 497 
(1968); McLaughlin v. City & County 
of San Francisco, 264 Cal. App.2d -, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1968). 
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In each case the court carefully reviewed the record to de-
termine whether or not there was justification for upholding 
the order on grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence. 
Although never clearly stated, each opinion gives the im-
pression that the appellate courts thought the original verdicts 
were justified. 
Specification of Reasons and the "Two-Issue Rule" 
Multiple issues present another problem in interpreting 
the· specification provision of section 657 when a new trial 
is based on the insufficiency of the evidence. For example, 
in a simple automobile accident case where negligence of the 
defendant and contributory negligence are both in issue, a new 
trial granted for plaintiff after a defense verdict must pre-
sumably be based on the notion that the preponderance of 
the evidence showed not only that defendant was negligent 
but also that plaintiff was not. It would seem to follow that 
the court should specify its reasons on both of these issues.17 
In two cases, Funderburk v. General Telephone Co. IS and 
Kramer v. Boynton/9 the trial court mentioned that the evi-
dence was insufficient regarding only one of the basic issues, 
presumably leaving it open to interpretation whether or not 
the other issue justified upholding the verdict. On appeal from 
an order granting a new trial, the appellant in each case argued 
that since, under section 657, it is presumed conclusively 
that the order is granted only for the reasons specified, the 
failure to specify on all such issues was fatal. In both cases 
it was held that such a technical reading of the statute was 
improper, that it must be assumed the trial court knew the 
law and knew it has stated reasons with respect to only one 
issue. It was further assumed that the judge did not grant 
a new trial frivolously and thus impliedly determined that the 
evidence on other grounds was not sufficient to justify the 
17. See e.g. Matlock v. Farmers Mer- 19. 258 Cal. App.2d 171, 65 Cal. 
cantile Co., 258 Cal. App.2d 362, 65 Rptr. 669 (1968). 
Cal. Rptr. 723 (1968). 
18. 262 Cal. App.2d 869, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 275 (1968). 
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verdict. The decisions tend to make sense because they pre-
vent a trap for an unwary court which might fail to specify 
every conceivable defense as having been insufficiently es-
tablished, but they are difficult to justify in light of the tech-
nical interpretation of the statute given by Mercer. If the pur-
pose is to make the trial court think through its decision care-
fully, it seems necessary to require the trial court to expressly 
deal with every issue that could determine the case. 
Conclusion 
As a result of the Mercer and Treber holdings, it is in-
cumbent upon any party who is moving for a new trial to 
specify in his motion every conceivable ground upon which 
the new trial may be granted. By doing so, he maximizes his 
chances for upholding the order if the trial court's specifica-
tions of reasons or grounds is deemed insufficient to uphold 
it on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, the 
successful moving party should urge the trial judge to comply 
with the mandate of section 657 in giving his grounds and 
reasons. He might also gratuitously submit a proposed set of 
specifications, even though he cannot be forced to do so, since 
pursuant to the statutory purpose, the court must prepare its 
own. The danger of this gratuitous assistance is that the 
trial judge may come to expect it and will fail to comply with 
the statute in its absence. 
When an appeal of a new trial order has been taken, it 
behooves the appellee to cross-appeal whenever he can legiti-
mately do so. If he does, he provides the appellate court 
an opportunity to overturn an unjust decision, even though for 
technical faults it is unable to uphold an otherwise appropriate 
grant of a new trial motion. 20 
20. When a party's motion for a new 
trial has been granted on the insuffi· 
ciency of the evidence and the appeal 
is based on the inadequacy of the 
specifications, it is not only important 
for the appellee to point out to the 
appellate court that the motion for new 
trial included grounds other than in-
sufficiency of the evidence, he must also 
be sure to augment the record on appeal 
to permit the court of appeal to see 
whether or not the motion can be up-
held on one of the other grounds. Thus 
in Tagney v. Hoy, 260 Cal. App.2d 
372, 67 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1968), where 
appellee neither cross-appealed nor 
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The supreme court needs to clarify the uncertainties of 
the interpretation raised by the new provisions of section 657. 
Indeed one might hope that the legislature will reconsider the 
entire section in an effort to clarify it. Why a failure of 
specification of reasons should be fatal when the ground is 
insufficiency of the evidence and not when the error is of 
another type is unclear. The basic policies of the new act, 
to force the trial judge to reflect with care on his decision 
and to assist the appellate court in determining what matters 
are significant on appeal, can best be served by making the 
penalties for failure to comply with the statute's requirements 
identical, regardless of the particular ground and reasons upon 
which the order for new trial is based. 
Class Actions 
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. l the Supreme Court of 
California once again attempted to define the limits of a 
permissible class action. The plaintiff, suing on behalf of 
himself and all others similarly situated, alleged that the 
defendant, Yellow Cab Company, violated a contract with the 
City of Los Angeles to charge rates according to amounts 
fixed by the Public Utilities Commission of that city. The 
specific claim was that the taxicab meters had been set to 
register rates in excess of those set by the commission, so all 
persons who had used the taxicabs were overcharged.2 Plain-
tiff sought to recover the total amount of the overcharge for 
the four years prior to the suit (the four years being the appli-
cable statute of limitations period for written contracts). 
Plaintiff further alleged that the exact amount of the over-
charge was known to the defendant and could be ascertained 
at trial. The trial court held that a class action was improper; 
the supreme court reversed. 
augmented the record, the court was 
forced to reverse the order granting 
the new trial. 
1. 67 Cal.2d 695, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 
433 P.2d 732 (1967). 
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The authority for class actions is found in section 382 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, a section so broad in its terms 
that it would permit a class action to be maintained in prac-
tically every instance a party so denominates his case.3 The 
California courts, while paying lip service to the statutory 
requirements, have virtually rewritten them according to their 
notions of what a class action should in fact accomplish. 
As the court in Daar pointed out, it has been uniformly said 
that two requirements must be met to sustain any class action: 
( 1) There must be an ascertainable class and (2) there must 
be among the parties to be represented a well defined com-
munity of interest in the questions of law and fact involved. 
A thorough study of case law reveals that these two require-
ments are but one. The court in Darr recognized this: 
[W]hether there is an ascertainable class depends in turn 
upon the community of interest among the class members 
in the questions of law and fact involved. If we con-
clude that the instant complaint properly sets forth a 
class action, the judgment herein would be res judicata 
as to all persons to whom the common questions of law 
and fact pertain. We therefore proceed to examine the 
complaint in order to determine whether it sets forth 
a sufficient community of interests. 
The court completely dispelled any notion that the plaintiff 
or the court at the outset must be able to determine precisely 
who are the members of the class. The court said, "If the 
existence of an ascertainable class has been shown, there is 
no need to identify its individual members in order to bind all 
members by the judgment. The fact that the class members 
3. § 382. Parties in interest, when to 
be joined: When one or more may 
sue or defend for the whole. Of the 
parties to the action, those who are 
united in interest must be joined as 
plaintiffs or defendants; but if the con-
sent of anyone who should have been 
joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, 
he may be made a defendant, the rea-
son thereof being stated in the com-
plaint; and when the question is one 
of a common or general interest, of 
many persons, or when the parties are 
numerous, and it is impracticable to 
bring them aU before the court, one or 
more may sue or defend for the benefit 
of aU. 
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are unidentifiable at this point will not preclude a complete 
determination of the issues affecting the c1ass.,,4 
In several prior cases the courts seemed to indicate that 
the failure of a class action was due to the inability to identify 
in advance the members of the class with some precision. In 
the often quoted case of Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of 
Roses Ass'n.,5 in which a suit was brought on behalf of persons 
who allegedly had been unlawfully deprived of tickets to an 
athletic contest, the court said, "In the present case, there is 
no ascertainable class, such as the stockholders, bondholders, 
or creditors of an organization. Rather, there is only a large 
number of individuals, each of whom mayor may not have, 
or care to assert, a claim against the operators of the 1947 
Rose Bowl Game for the alleged wrongful refusal of admission 
thereto."6 The court went on to state that it could find no 
case in which it "has been held that a representative or class 
suit was a proper or appropriate vehicle for the determination 
of alleged tort liability of defendants to numerous unnamed 
and unascertained persons."7 
In the Weaver case the class was defined as all those persons 
who, in answering an advertisement offering tickets to the 
Rose Bowl Game, had appeared at the ticket office at the 
appointed time, had received a stub supposedly assuring them 
of the right to purchase two tickets to the Rose Bowl Game, 
and had been refused tickets and admission. There was, 
of course, no record from which the court could ascertain 
the exact persons to whom the stubs were given and to whom 
admission was refused. In the Daar case some persons in the 
class could be ascertained because they paid for their taxi-
cab charges with script, circulated and paid for in advance by 
certain taxicab users. Most class members, however, were cas-
ual users of taxicabs who paid cash. An attempt to identify 
these persons would be as futile as an attempt to identify the 
people standing in line in the Weaver case. The Weaver case, 
4. 67 Cal.2d at 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
732, 433 P.2d at 740. 
5. 32 Cal.2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 
(1948). 
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however, did not turn on the inability to identify class mem-
bers, but on the inability of the court to provide direct relief 
that would encompass all the individuals within the defined 
class. In short, there was no so-called "community of inter-
est," which is really at the heart of the class action problem. 
Much has been said about what it a proper community of 
interest upon which a class action may be maintained. An 
analysis of the California decisions reveals clearly that a 
proper community of interest depends upon whether or not the 
court can determine if a judgment against the defendant, 
should he lose, would finally settle the defendant's liability, 
and the amount thereof, to the class as a whole. If so, then the 
fact that individual members of the class must come into the 
case to prove their share of the recovery will not bar the 
class action; but when no specific judgment can be rendered 
for the class as a whole against the defendant, the class action 
is not permitted. In the Weaver case, for example, where 
it was alleged that each plaintiff was entitled to actual damages 
plus the $100 penalty damages under section 53 of the Civil 
Code, the court refused to permit a class action on the ground 
that, under the statute, to be entitled to the $100 amount each 
person would have had to prove that he was neither drunk, 
disorderly nor guilty of lewd or immoral conduct; that he 
was present at the box office; that he received a stub; and 
that he was refused a ticket and admission to the Rose Bowl 
Game. Furthermore, he would have had to prove any in-
dividual damages sought over and above the statutory penalty. 
The total amount of liability the defendant would suffer in the 
event of judgment for the plaintiff was unascertainable, not 
only because it was unknown how many persons would come 
forward, but also because their individual rights against the 
defendant varied. Class actions have also been held inappro-
priate in similar circumstances where varying individual dam-
ages or defendant's personal defenses to individual claims 
render the total amount of the liability unascertainable.8 
8. See, for example, Barber v. Cal-
ifornia Employment Stabilization Com-
mission, 130 Cal. App.2d 7, 278 P.2d 
762 (J 964); Most Worshipful Sons of 
14 
Light Grand Lodge v. Sons of Light 
Lodge No.9, 118 Cal. App.2d 78, 257 
P.2d 464 (1953). 
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When the nature of the relief sought is equitable and in-
volves a simple judgment against the defendant which has 
nothing to do with the individual rights of the members of 
the plaintiff class, the courts have had no difficulty in finding 
a class action appropriate. In Heffernan v. Bennett & Ar-
mour/ a number of defendant's creditors brought a class suit 
to set aside a conveyance allegedly made as a fraud upon the 
creditors. The court upheld the suit, noting that it was un-
important that some known creditors might not be able to 
prove their claims because of the statute of limitations or 
that other creditors might be unknown. The importance was 
that a judgment for all the creditors could be rendered against 
the defendant regarding the particular matter at interest, the 
setting aside of a fraudulent conveyance. A similar case, 
City and County of San Francisco v. Market St. Ry./o held that 
a group of individuals each of whom had filed a personal in-
jury claim against a defendant corporation, could sue as a 
class to enjoin that corporation from paying a liquidation 
dividend to its stockholders which would have rendered any 
of the plaintiffs' tort claims unenforceable. 
Although more recent cases pose difficult factual questions, 
the results support the hypothesis that class actions are per-
mitted if, but only if, the court may grant complete relief 
against the defendant in the actual suit before it. In Chance v. 
Superior Court/I suit was brought on behalf of the owners 
of 2,139 trust deeds, all representing security interests in 
separate but contiguous lots situated within a single tract of 
land. Suit to foreclose was brought on behalf of all the trust 
deed owners against the property owner who was alleged to 
have been in default on his obligations. The plaintiffs wanted 
a declaration that defendant was in default to all of them; 
that each deed was not a purchase money trust deed, which 
could be satisfied only upon sale of the particular lot which it 
represented; and that the entire land secured by the trust deed 
9. 110 Cal. App.2d 564, 243 P.2d 11. 58 Cal.2d 275, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 
846 (1952). 373 P.2d 849 (1962). 
10. 95 Cal. App.2d 648, 213 P.2d 
780. See also Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 
Cal. App. 505, 264 P. 1115 (1928). 
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notes be sold by a commissioner as a unit under defendant's 
stipulation "that the land in the within tracts is more valuable 
as one integral unit than if the parcels are sold individually."12 
The property owner argued that there was no community of 
interest among the parties because each had separately pur-
chased his own trust deeds and would have to show that de-
fendant was in default to him and because defendant had 
separate defenses against individual plaintiffs which would 
have to be litigated separately. In answering these arguments 
plaintiffs relied on another stipulation by defendant that the 
actions have "common questions of law and fact with all of 
the deeds of trust being in default and the issues to be decided 
by the Court and the defenses of the defendants being the 
same for all investors in each tract.,,13 Thus it was pos-
sible in Chance, on a given set of facts as proved by the 
parties, for the court to give one relief against the defendant 
that would encompass the entire class. 
In Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co.,14 plaintiffs brought suit 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against 
a cotton ginning company. Over a period of years the plain-
tiffs, who were cotton growers, delivered their cotton to de-
fendants who separated the lint from the seed, paid each grower 
for the actual amount of lint obtained, and without weighing 
the seed, paid each grower for his seed a certain amount based 
upon an arbitrary formula. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
arbitrary formula permitted the defendants to retain part of 
the proceeds from the seed delivered to them and that this 
"overage" belonged to the growers. Defendants claimed that 
no class action could be maintained because the rights of each 
owner depended upon his individual contracts with the de-
fendant corporation. The trial court held that a class action 
was inappropriate; the appellate court reversed. 
The appellate court reasoned that anyone grower would 
have to establish the same facts as any other grower would 
12. 58 Cal.2d at 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. 14. 151 Cal. App.2d 72, 311 P.2d 
at 765, 373 P.2d at 853. 33 (1957). 
13. 58 Cal.2d at 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. 
at 767, 373 P.2d at 855. 
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have to establish-that the seeds were never weighed and that 
each grower's seeds were mingled with all other seeds. Al-
though each grower could collect only a pro rata share of the 
"overage," the company's records, with the aid of mere 
mathematical computations, enabled the pro rata shares to be 
ascertained. 
The most difficult aspect of the Fanucchi decision involved 
the problem of individual defenses. It was alleged, for ex-
ample, that certain growers would not be entitled to collect, 
since they had known and had consented to the method by 
which they had been paid for their seed. The court simply 
decided that such defenses could be handled individually when 
each grower attempted to collect for his alleged losses. At first 
glance this decision seems to put Fanucchi in a category with 
Weaver, in which a final, complete determination could not be 
made against the defendant. However, from the allegations of 
the complaint it was clear that in Fanucchi the total amount 
of the defendant's potential liability to all of the owners could 
be established. The only necessary determination was that 
defendant owed the plaintiff class a certain amount of money; 
a later determination would divide the money among the mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' class. Each member would have to come 
in and prove his interest in the same way that creditors must 
come in and prove their rights to funds set aside for creditors. 
The actual prayer for relief in Fanucchi was that the defend-
ants be declared constructive trustees of all the "overage" and 
that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the cottonseed 
or its reasonable value and then to distribute the same among 
the growers according to their interests. This remedy enabled 
the court to make a final determination in favor of the class 
as a whole, against the defendants. 
The Daar case bears marked similarities to Fanucchi. In 
one sense, Daar is less difficult since there would be no in-
dividual defenses with regard to the amount of overcharge 
made by the taxi drivers (assuming, as was alleged, that such 
overcharges could be ascertained by the company). But 
Daar is more difficult than most other cases in which a class 
action is upheld, since in Daar there was no way to identify 
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the individual members of the class. Unlike the growers in 
Fanucchi who appeared on the records of the books, not all 
the taxi users in Daar appeared on the records. 
As already noted, however, Daar took the position that in-
dividual members of the class do not have to be ascertained. 
Although the situation in Daar renders administration of the 
second phase of litigation-the proving of claims by indi-
viduals-extremely difficult, this obstacle should in no way 
detract from the validity of the class action. It is not as 
hard for an individual to prove his claims in a proceeding 
to determine what portion of a fund he is entitled to collect 
as it is for him to bring an individual suit against the Yellow 
Cab Company for a few dollars. Many plaintiffs would simply 
forego suit; among those who did sue there would be much 
duplication of effort (cost of filing, and the like) and, be-
cause of the inability of each individual plaintiff to gather 
the proper evidence to prove his case, inconsistent decisions. 
In the final analysis, the Daar case is justified simply on the 
basis that an overall decision of liability could be made in the 
class suit against the defendant for a specific sum of money. 
The uncertainties of ultimate liability that existed in the 
Weaver case were not present. 
There are two important factors in Daar still to be discussed. 
The court did not clearly articulate the nature of a valid class 
action in terms of the nature of the relief sought and avail-
able. There is too much uncertainty in the law today leading 
to too many costly and unnecessary appeals. Perhaps most 
desirable would be legislation to replace the inaqequate and 
misleading class action provision of section 382 and to adopt a 
provision similar to the new Federal Rule 23, which was 
promulgated after a long study of the class action problem. 
The court in Daar cited the new Federal Rule 23 and noted 
that it is in substantial agreement with the court's views on 
class actions. The purpose of the rule was to list those 
factors which the federal courts may weigh in determining 
whether or not a class action is appropriate. Thus a class 
action is permitted when: 
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The court finds that the questions of law or fact common 
to the members of the class predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) The in-
terest of members of the class in individually controlling 
the prosecution or defense of separate action; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of 
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of con-
centrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action. 
The court in Daar seemed to be applying this weighing stand-
ard when it noted that the action would not be brought if it 
had to be brought by each individual separately for the pittance 
he would be entitled to collect, and when it also noted that 
common questions predominated over any individual ques-
tions which might arise. 
Unfortunately, the reference in Daar to Federal Rule 23 
is somewhat confusing. It is not clear if the court wished to 
go so far as to permit class actions in cases where the criteria 
of Rule 23 would be met even when no class judgment could 
be had against the defendant for a given amount, or a given 
relief, as was possible in such cases as Chance, Fanucchi, and 
Daar itself. 
In a subsequent case, Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v. 
Parker15 the court of appeal refused to permit a class action 
by persons who were suing in fraud for individual damages 
even though the fraud was similar if not identical with respect 
to each of them. The court said, "[W]hether the Federal 
Rule would demand judicial acceptance of the present class 
action is problematical. California criteria demonstrate pro-
priety of the trial court's rejection."16 The allegation in 
15. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 16. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
269 (1968). Rptr. at 273. 
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Slakey was that defendants by misrepresenting their financial 
standing defrauded plaintiffs into forebearing to sue for col-
lection of certain outstanding claims. The court relied pri-
marily on the notion that each individual plaintiff would have 
to prove what misrepresentations were made to him, what he 
relied upon, and what his damages were. The court admitted 
that there were common issues of law and fact, including 
alleged identical misrepresentations which were addressed to 
each member of the group sought to be represented collectively. 
One can see then that the criteria of Federal Rule 23 might 
have been satisfied despite the necessity of individual recovery 
by each member of the class. 
Certainly the California Supreme Court, if not the legis-
lature, will have to clear up the ambiguities-not only those 
caused by Daar's reference to the Federal Rule, but also those 
which have existed for a long time because of the profusion 
of uncertain decisions. 
The Daar case raises one other interesting point. It falls 
within the scope of the prior cases only because plaintiffs 
alleged that defendant knew or could determine the amount 
of overcharge that was made over the past four years. The 
court took the position that it had to accept this allegation 
as true. Defendant, on the other hand, asked the court to 
take judicial notice of the cab company's charging policies, 
which included an initial premium rate, a mileage rate, a 
waiting time rate, and other factors-all making the exact 
amount of overcharge impossible to ascertain. The court 
rejected judicial notice as inappropriate. Nevertheless, this 
problem raises this question: May the objecting parties now 
proceed to raise the impropriety of a class suit in their plead-
ings and request a hearing under section 597 of the Code of 
Civil Procedurel7, 18 so that the disputed issues of fact on this 
17,18. CCP § 597 provides: "When 
the answer . . . sets up any other 
defense not involving the merits of the 
plaintiff's cause of action but constitut-
ing a bar or ground of abatement to the 
prosecution thereof, the court may, 
upon motion of either party, proceed 
to the trial of such special defense or 
defenses before the trial of any other 
issue in the case, and if the decision of 
the court, or the verdict of the jury 
upon any special defense so tried . . . 
is in favor of the defendant pleading 
the same, judgment for such defendant 
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matter will be determined before any trial on the merits? If 
so, the class action, it would seem, is still subject to attack. 
All that has been accomplished is to get it past the demurrer 
stage. 
Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute 
In Sylvestre v. King Manufacturing Co.19 a cleaning product 
of the defendant exploded, injuring the plaintiff who was 
working with it. In anticipation of bringing suit, plaintiff 
in August, 1961, had written to the defendant company at its 
Michigan office, but had received no reply. Upon inquiry, the 
California Secretary of State informed plaintiff that a Cali-
fornia corporation by the name of King Manufacturing Com-
pany had been suspended for failure to pay taxes. Plaintiff 
erroneously assumed that this was the same corporation that 
had allegedly caused his injuries. Therefore, plaintiff brought 
suit in a California superior court. Although the action was 
filed on November 24, 1961, not until May, 1964, did plain-
tiff discover that the proper defendant, King Company, lo-
cated in Michigan, was in fact not a corporation but a single 
proprietorship, had no agents for service of process in Cali-
fornia and had no direct contacts with the state that would 
bring it within the jurisdiction of the California Courts. By 
the time plaintiff moved for service by publication on the owner 
of the company, more than three years had elapsed from the 
date the complaint was filed. Upon the defendant's motion 
the court dismissed the action under section 581a of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. The court of appeal reversed. 
Section 581 a requires that an action be dismissed by the 
court unless summons is served upon the defendant within 
three years after the commencement of the action. The 
section, however, exempts from its operation failure to serve 
any defendant due to "his absence from the state, or while 
shall thereupon be entered and no trial 19. 256 Cal. App.2d 236, 64 Cal. 
of other issues in the action shall be Rptr. 4 (1967). 
had unless such judgment shall be re-
versed on appeal or otherwise set aside 
or vacated . . ." 
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he has secreted himself within the state to prevent the service 
of summons on him."20 The issue in Sylvestre was whether 
this exception refers to a non-resident who has never been in 
the state of California or covers only residents of the state 
who have left for a period of time. The Code Commissioner's 
note to section 581 a indicates that the purpose of the exception 
is to cover circumstances where a defendant leaves the state to 
avoid being served. This purpose, of course, excludes a de-
fendant who has never been in the state. 
The court held, however, that the exceptions in the act apply 
to individuals who have never been residents of the state. It 
relied heavily on the effect of section 417, which permits a 
personal judgment to be rendered against persons outside the 
state on service by publication if the person was either a 
resident of the state at the time of the commencement of the 
20. CCP § 581a. When action to be 
dismissed: lack of prosecution: ex-
ception. 
No action heretofore or hereafter 
commenced shall be further prosecuted, 
and no further proceedings shall be had 
therein, and all actions heretofore or 
hereafter commenced must be dismissed 
by the court in which the same shall 
have been commenced, on its own mo-
tion, or on the motion of any party in-
terested therein, whether named in the 
complaint as a party or not, unless sum-
mons shall have issued within one year, 
and all such actions must be in like 
manner dismissed, unless the summons 
shall be served and return thereon made 
within three years after the commence-
ment of said action, except where the 
parties have filed a stipulation in writ-
ing that the time may be extended. But 
all such actions may be prosecuted, if 
general appearance has been made by 
the defendant or defendants, within said 
three years in the same manner as if 
summons had been issued and served; 
provided, that, except in actions to par-
tition or to recover possession of, or to 
enforce a lien upon, or to determine 
conflicting claims to. real or personal 
property. no dismissal shall be had un-
der this section as to any defendant 
because of the failure to serve summons 
on him during his absence from the 
State, or while he has secreted himself 
within the State to prevent the service 
of summons on him. 
All actions, heretofore or hereafter 
commenced, must be dismissed by the 
court in which the same may be pend-
ing. on its own motion, or on the mo-
tion of any party interested therein, if 
summons has been served, and no an-
swer has been filed, if plaintiff fails, or 
has failed, to have judgment entered 
within three years after service of sum-
mons, except where the parties have 
filed a stipulation in writing that the 
time may be extended. 
A motion to dismiss pursuant to the 
provisions of this section shall not. nor 
shall any extension of time to plead 
after such motion. constitute a general 
appearance. (Added Cal. Stats. 1907, 
ch. 376, p. 712. * 2. As amended Cal. 
Stats. 1933. ch. 744. p. 1869. § 89; Cal. 
Stats. 1949, ch. 463. p. 810. * I: Cal. 
Stats. 1955. ch. 1452. p. 2640. § 5.1 
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action, at the time the cause of the action arose, or at the 
time of service. The court said that if section 581 a applies 
only to one-time residents, the exceptions in section 581 a 
would not be necessary; for section 417 permits service when-
ever the individual has been a resident and has left the juris-
diction. Section 581a and its exceptions can apply only to 
non-residents who cannot be served under section 417. The 
court's analysis is weak since one may pose a case where the 
statutes would not overlap. If the defendant in this case was 
not a resident at the time the cause of action arose, subse-
quently became a resident of the state, and then left the state 
immediately after discovering an action would soon be brought 
against him, he would not be subject to section 417. He 
was a resident neither at the time of commencement nor at 
the time the cause of action arose. Presumably then, section 
581a could apply. However, one need not resort to this kind 
of reasoning to attack the court's reliance on section 417. 
Looking at the problem realistically, the legislature prob-
ably did not consider whether or not section 581 a should 
apply to those who have never been residents. This is, par-
ticularly evident since section 417 was first enacted in 1951, 
long after section 581 a. The purpose of 417 is to give 
California personal jurisdiction over defendants outside its 
borders; the purpose of 581 a is to require plaintiffs to press 
their actions so that they do not remain dormant, clogging 
calendars and causing unnecessary confusion. Section 581 a 
assumes that if plaintiff will only take the appropriate steps, 
proper jurisdiction over defendant can be obtained. 
The court in Sylvestre supported its position further by 
stating that it is unfair to force a plaintiff to seek service by 
publication in order to satisfy the time limitations of section 
581 a when he cannot obtain jurisdiction over the defendant or 
any of his property. The court's assumption that had such 
worthless publication been made, the requirements of section 
581a would have been satisfied, is surprising. Since the 
policy of 581 a is to keep courts free from stale actions, it is 
more reasonable to hold that the statute requires not only 
timely service, but also effective service by which jurisdiction 
218 CAL LAW 1969 
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is obtained. The reason for allowing a case to remain pending 
is not greater when jurisdiction is unobtainable for three years 
than when it is obtainable but plaintiff fails to take action. 
As the court itself noted, if section 581a need not be met, 
a plaintiff, when suing an out-of-state defendant, need only 
file his action before the statute of limitations has run and then 
wait until such time as defendant might venture into the state 
so that valid jurisdiction could be obtained; no limitation what-
soever is applicable. The court aptly pointed out that if such 
jurisdiction is ever obtained, perhaps many years later, a 
defense might be difficult, if not impossible, to prove. But 
the court failed to pursue this point, thus avoiding discussion 
of the full impact of its decision on subsequent cases. In-
stead, it noted that the defendants in this particular case had 
actually been notified and could have come in to make a de-
fense. As far as the court was concerned, the notification 
took the sting out of the notion that the service of process 
might ultimately be made so late as to injure the defendant's 
presentation of her case. The court cited Carmichael v. Supe-
rior Court l as direct authority for its holding. In that case 
the defendant sought dismissal on the grounds not only that 
section 581 a2 applied, but also that the plaintiff had not 
brought the action to trial within five years as required by 
section 583. The motion to dismiss was denied and defend-
ant brought his case to the court of appeal. It was admitted 
that the defendant had been out of the state before and since 
the commencement of the action. The court read the cases 
under section 583 as not requiring dismissal after five years 
if special circumstances interrupted the running of the period. 
It further held that such circumstances exist whenever it is 
impractical to bring the case to trial, even though defendant 
1. 55 Cal. App.2d 406, 130 P.2d 725 
(1942). 
2. The pertinent portions of CCP 
§ 583 provide: "Any action heretofore 
or hereafter commenced shall be dis-
missed by the court in which the same 
shall have been commenced or to which 
it may be transferred on motion of the 
defendant, after due notice to plaintiff 
or by the court upon its own motion, 
unless such action is brought to trial 
within five years after the plaintiff has 
filed his action . . . except where 
it be shown that the defendant has been 
absent from the State . . " 
CAL LAW 1969 219 
29
Friedenthal: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Civil Procedure 
has not been guilty of acts tending to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice. In Carmichael, as in Sylvestre, defendant 
continually resided outside the state, so there was no way to 
obtain jurisdiction over him. The court in Carmichael, in a 
single paragraph, rejected the contention that the action should I 
be dismissed under section 581 a; it merely stated that the 
section provides that no dismissal shall be had for failure to I 
serve summons on a defendant during his absence from the 
state-presumably holding that the statute was clear on its 
face. s 
The court in Sylvestre also cited cases interpreting section 
351, which provides that a statute of limitations does not run 
against a person while he is out of the state.4 In one case 
cited, Cvecich v. Giardino,5 the court held that the statute 
applies even though the defendant had never been in the 
state at all. The defendant in Cvecich argued that this in-
terpretation would even allow an out-of-state plaintiff to sue 
an out-of-state defendant in California at any time. In reply, 
the court noted that section 351 would not apply in such a 
situation. Instead, the case would be subject to section 361, 
which provides that the statute of limitations of the state 
where the cause of action arose applies to any action "except 
in favor of one who has been a citizen of this State, and who 
has held the cause of action from the time it accrued."6 It is 
important to note that there is no comparable limitation re-
garding service of process under section 581 a. Thus, under 
3. 55 Cal. App.2d at 409, 130 P.2d 
at 726. 
4. CCP Ii 351. Exception, where de-
fendant is out of the state. If, when 
the cause of action accrues against a 
person. he is out of the state, the ac-
tion may be commenced within the term 
herein limited, after his return to the 
state, and if. after the cause of action 
accrues, he departs from the state, the 
time of his absence is not part of the 
time limited for the commencement of 
the action. 
5. 37 Cal. App.2d 394, 99 P.2d 573 
(1940). 
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6. Tn Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App. 
2d 309 at 318, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49 at 55 
(1965), the court held that the statute 
of limitations did not begin to run on 
two out-of-state architects who agreed 
to design and supervise the building of 
a house in California while they were 
out-of-state. The statute began to run, 
said the court, only after they stipulated 
to jurisdiction over them. The fact that 
no service could be made was held to 
be sufficient reason for the statute not 
to fun. 
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Sylvestre even an out-of-state plaintiff may sue an out-of-state 
defendant in California, and as long as he files the action 
within the prescribed period of limitations, he may leave his 
action pending until such time as he is able to obtain juris-
diction-a time distant in the future or perhaps never. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Sylvestre is that it 
relied on the California Supreme Court decision of Wyoming 
Pacific Oil Co. v. Preston.7 Wyoming Pacific held that the 
seeming mandatory provisions of 58 I a were subject to some 
judicial discretion and reversed an order of dismissal. The 
court drew a parallel between section 58 I a and section 583 
and then asserted that in the so-called mandatory dismissal 
provisions of 583, judicial discretion did exist for permitting 
the action to be continued under special circumstances. 
The plaintiff in Wyoming Pacific had filed an action against 
several defendants in December, 1952. One defendant was 
served in February, 1955. About two weeks before the three 
year period for service and return of summons expired "fever-
ish attempts were made" to serve defendant Bush. Plaintiff 
was unsuccessful until shortly after the three year period had 
run. Bush filed a motion to quash summons and a motion to 
dismiss supported by an affidavit showing that he was accessi-
ble at his home and office prior to the time plaintiff began his 
"feverish attempts." In denying the motions the supreme court 
seemed to eliminate any requirement that a plaintiff be dili-
gent throughout the three year period.s 
The Wyoming Pacific case is adversely criticized in 6 
U.C.L.A. Law Review 476 (1959) on the ground that the 
decision subverted the purpose of 581 a: to require prompt 
service, preventing the cumulation of stale claims and the 
crowding of court calendars.9 At least, it is noted, 581 a 
7. 50 Cal. 2d 736, 329 P.2d 489 
(1958). 
8. The Wyoming case was discussed 
in Hill v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. App. 
2d 746, 59 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1967) in 
which the court of appeal took the posi-
tion that the discretion there should be 
special and that the Wyoming Pacific 
case should be limited to its facts. How-
ever, in the Hill case, the clear distinc-
tion that was made was between a case 
of impossibility or high impracticability 
of service and a case where service 
was possible but not carried out. 
9. As was pointed out by the author, 
the court has discretionary power to 
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should never be subject to discretion when the out-of-state 
defendant is subject to jurisdiction under section 417.10 When 
prosecution of a case is possible, it is unconscionable to allow 
a plaintiff to delay indefinitely such prosecution until defend-
ant may have difficulty in presenting his case. ll 
By relying on Wyoming Pacific, Sylvestre becomes part of 
a pattern in the courts eliminating the mandatory rules which 
require dismissal because of the failure or inability of an at-
torney to carry forward a case. Not long after Sylvestre was 
decided the California Supreme Court itself in Weeks v. 
Roherts12 so construed the five-year dismissal provision in sec-
tion 583 in order to permit a stale claim to be continued in 
the courts by expanding the special circumstances in which 
judicial discretion could be exercised. In Weeks the plaintiff 
failed to have his case tried before the five year period had 
elapsed. As the five year limit neared plaintiff prevailed on 
one trial judge to set a trial date some twenty-eight days ahead, 
just within the five year period. Defendant by a motion to 
the judge in charge of the master calendar obtained an order 
vacating that trial date, apparently on the ground that there 
was insufficient time to prepare. As a result, no new date 
could be set prior to the running of the period, and plaintiff's 
case was dismissed under 583. The supreme court reversed 
the dismissal on the ground it constituted an abuse of discre-
tion. The majority thought twenty-eight days was a reason-
able time in which to provide facilities for a trial and that the 
order of the master calendar judge was therefore improper. 13 
The weakness in all these cases is the unwillingness of the 
appellate court to press for needed procedural regularity when 
dismiss a case for lack of prosecution 
even before the three year period under 
§ 581 a has elapsed. This is clear from 
§ 583 which permits a court to dismiss 
anytime after two years from the com-
mencement of the action. 
10, 11. See 6 UCLA Law Review at 
480. 
12. 68 Cal.2d 802, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305, 
442 P .2d 361 (1968). 
222 CAL LAW 1969 
13. Three judges dissented, not on the 
ground that ~ 583 did not allow the dis-
cretionary determination, but on the 
ground that the master calendar, par-
ticularly in Los Angeles County, where 
suit was brought, is extremely difficult 
to control and that it must be within the 
discretion of the calendar judge to de-
termine just when cases can and cannot 
be brought to trial. 
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to do so may cut off the rights of individual plaintiffs. The 
reason is not so much that the courts disapprove of the manda-
tory provisions as that they fear unfairness may result. Un-
fortunately, the decisions rarely delve deeply enough into 
the problem to see undesirable long range consequences. The 
facts of Sylvestre provide a perfect example. Before plaintiff 
could attempt to serve process he necessarily had to file his 
action. Once he had filed he suddenly learned that he could 
not obtain jurisdiction over defendant. He was not able to 
proceed with the action and yet was subject to dismissal under 
581a if he did not. Apparently, he faced a dilemma that 
could be resolved only if the court held as it did. But surely, 
plaintiff had a reasonable alternative: He could have filed 
suit in defendant's home state and voluntarily dismissed the 
California proceeding. 
The underlying assumption of the Sylvestre d~cision is that 
a plaintiff should always be encouraged to file suit in his 
home state regardless of what is the nature of the action, 
where it arose or where defendant is located. But this as-
sumption is contrary to the basic policy of the constitutional 
and statutory laws governing personal jurisdiction. If it is 
desirable to bring suits against out-of-state defendants, a 
proper long-arm statute should be enacted, as has been done 
by many states. When constitutional, the defendants may then 
be brought before the court promptly; the cases may be prose-
cuted with dispatch; service of summons need not be delayed; 
and any resultant difficulties to plaintiff, defendant or the 
court may be avoided. There is no reason then not to apply 
section 581 a firmly. If the case is one in which the Cali-
fornia courts do not have constitutional power to take juris-
diction over the ctefendant or one in which the legislature 
consciously determines that such jurisdiction should not be 
exercised, surely, the action should not be permitted to remain 
pending indefinitely in California courts. 
Multiple Cost Bills for Testimony of an Expert Witness 
May each of a number of prevailing co-parties in an action 
obtain as part of his costs the full statutory witness fee and 
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travel costs for an expert witness who testified on behalf of 
each of such co-parties? He may, according to City of Dow-
ney v. Gonzales. 14 Suit was brought by the City to condemn 
15 parcels of property to make way for a municipal hospital. 
Only 13 separate claims were stated because some of the 
parcels were owned by the same persons, and claims for these 
parcels were lumped together. There were a total of 28 de-
fendants since most of the parcels were owned by more than 
one individual. 
At the close of the case, each of the 28 defendants filed 
a bill for costs with appropriate supporting data, and each 
claimed the statutory per diem witness fee of $4 plus travel 
costs, amounting to a total of $9 per day, for an expert ap-
praiser who had been hired jointly by all of the defendants 
to testify on their behalf. The aggregate amount claimed for 
the eight days the expert attended trial was $2,016. The trial 
court allowed the defendants, in the aggregate, to collect but 
one fee plus mileage for each of the seven days the expert 
was summoned to testify, that is $63.16 
On appeal the decision was reversed. The court held, two 
to one, that defendants were entitled to collect for each of the 
13 separate claims a per diem fee plus mileage for each of the 
eight days the witness attended the trial. Justice Stephens, 
writing for the majority, reasoned that since the action in-
volved 13 different cases, which plaintiff elected to consolidate 
rather than bring separately, the prevailing parties on each 
claim should be able to collect costs as if they had been sued 
separately. The court pointed out that, although the trial 
judge has discretion to tax costs in eminent domain as in 
other cases, the state constitutional provision requiring the 
payment of just compensation for condemnation required pay-
ment to condemnees of their costs "necessarily incidental to 
the trial of the issues.,,16 The requisite necessity, according to 
14. 262 Cal. App.2d 563. 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 34 (1968). 
15. The witness was only subpoenaed 
for the first seven days of the trial. On 
the eighth day he appeared and testified 
voluntarily. The appellate court held 
224 CAL LAW 1969 
that defendants were entitled to witness 
fees for all eight days. 
16. City and County of San Fran-
cisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259 at 262, 33 
P. 56 at 57 (1893). 
34
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/10
Civil Procedure 
the court, was conclusively established because plaintiff City 
had not challenged defendants' verified cost bills which con-
stituted prima facie evidence that all items therein claimed 
had been necessarily incurred.17 
Although it would seem obvious, once the witness was 
present in court to testify for anyone defendant, there was 
no need for other defendants to incur any expenses to obtain 
his testimony, the court simply held that by calling any wit-
ness to testify on his behalf, every party obliges himself to 
pay that witness the statutory fees. 
The court's analysis is not persuasive. The technical argu-
ment that defendants' unchallenged cost bills must be accepted 
as establishing the necessity of the claimed expenses, regard-
less of the facts on the record, seems woefully weak. Surely, 
the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice of the 
number of times the expert witness actually traveled to court 
and the number of days he attended. IS 
The court of appeal itself did not give full credence to 
all the unchallenged cost memoranda and refused to permit 
recovery by all 28 defendants. Instead, it allowed persons 
who were co-owners of a single property to obtain costs only 
once among themselves. Even a person who owned two 
separate properties was permitted but one recovery for costS.19 
The court made these distinctions on the basis of an 1855 
case, Rice v. Leonard,20 which had held in a one page opinion, 
giving no specific facts whatever, that the successful co-de-
fendants were not entitled to separate awards for costs but 
could only recover such costs jointly. Why the Rice decision 
was not read simply as proscribing multiple recovery by all 
the successful co-defendants in Gonzales is unclear! 
17. Judge Aiso, who wrote a separate 
concurring opinion, placed heavy em-
phasis on this point. 
18. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 451, 452. 
19. 262 Cal. App.2d at 567, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 38. This determination seems 
inconsistent with the court's idea that 
separate claims entitle defendants to 
separate fees. The expert witness was 
15 
required to testify separately as to the 
value of the different parcels and sep-
arate actions would have been appro-
priate whether or not the owners of the 
different parcels were the same or differ-
ent people. 
20. 5 Cal. 61 (1855). 
1. In Branhart v. Kron, 88 Cal. 447, 
26 P. 210 (1891), a question arose 
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If the unchallenged cost memoranda are not to be con-
sidered conclusive, each defendant who seeks costs must es-
tablish from the facts the necessity for having obligated himself 
to pay the costs. 2 Such showing will depend on whether or 
not the majority was correct in stating that each defendant who 
called the expert witness to testify obligated himself to pay 
the witness both mileage and per diem fees even though the 
witness was already in court. The court cited only Govern-
ment Code section 68097, which provides that a witness may 
demand his mileage and per diem fees one day in advance and 
that the court shall not compel him to testify until this 
allowance is paid. But section 68097 in no way implies that 
once the witness is in court he is entitled to a duplicate fee 
from every litigant for whom he testifies. 
There are a number of older cases in other jurisdictions 
upon which the court might have relied. These decisions were 
made when courts generally thought that a witness attended 
court solely for the benefit of the party or parties for whom 
he was called to testify. For example, in Pearce v. Person,s 
it was held that when both the plaintiff and defendant sum-
moned a witness, he was entitled to collect his witness fee 
from both of them.4 
The argument of Judge Kaus who dissented in Gonzales is 
based on the assumption that a witness comes into court not 
simply for the benefit of parties for whom he testifies, but 
for the entire community. Thus the statutory fee is not a 
personal obligation of every litigant for whom the witness 
testifies, but a community obligation to every knowledgeable 
witness who comes to court. This is true even though the 
law normally requires the obligation to be discharged by one 
whether one defendant could obtain 
costs for a witness whose primary testi-
mony had been on behalf of a co-de-
fendant; the court, in allowing the costs, 
clearly implied that the only party who 
could collect was the one who had in 
fact incurred the expense. 
2. Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 Cal. 
App.2d 237, 250, 41 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 
(1964); Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, 
226 CAL LAW 1969 
Inc., 134 Cal. App.2d 622, 286 P.2d 30 
(1955). 
3. 5 N.C. 188 (1857). 
4. See also House v. Barber, 10 Vt. 
158 (1838); O'Kane v. People, 46 III. 
App. 225 (1892). But the courts were 
far from unanimous. See e.g. Renfro 
v. Kelly, 10 Ala. 338 (1846), holding 
contrary to Pearce v. Person. 
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or more of the parties (usually those who are unsuccessful). 
Strong support for this position appears in Wigmore on Evi-
dence, branding as false any "impression that the witness' duty 
runs to the parties and not to the community and that he is 
rendering his services for money to the party that desires 
them".5 
The few modern cases on this problem generally reject 
multiple recovery.6 The most recent decision, and one of the 
clearest, is Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide. 7 Three success-
ful plaintiffs, whose actions had been consolidated for trial, 
each sought to collect fees for the witnesses who had testified 
on their behalf. The court held that to allow triple witness 
fees would conflict with the policy of Federal Rule 42 (a), 
which permits the consolidation of claims in part "to avoid 
unnecessary costs." Surely it follows, if multiple fees are 
not to be permitted when the court consolidates actions origi-
nally brought as separate lawsuits, they should not be allowed 
when plaintiff consolidates the actions at the outset. 
Logicalty, it makes little sense to argue that a witness should 
be entitled to collect 13 per diem fees each day simply be-
cause the case happens to involve 13 sets of defendants. 
Similarly, it would be ridiculous to allow a witness to collect 
13 times for travel when he made but one trip. As Justice 
Kaus said, "At the very least, he should be forced to form a car 
pool with himself".8 
The majority decision in Gonzales can be understood only 
in light of the fact that it dealt not with an ordinary witness 
in an ordinary case, but with an expert appraiser in a con-
demnation proceeding. There is little doubt that each prop-
erty owner must, as a practical matter, employ an expert 
appraiser to testify on his behalf and that an expert appraiser 
5. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2201 (2) 
(iii) at page 135 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). 
6. Vilsack v. General Commercial 
Securities Corp., 106 Fla. 296, 143 So. 
250 (1932); Barnhart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D. 
423 (S.D.W. Va. [1949]); Reynolds 
Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 
335 (9th Cir. [1958]), cert. den. 358 
U.S. 840, 3 L.Ed.2d 76, 79 S. Ct. 66. 
7. 258 F.2d 321, 335 (9th Cir. 
[1958]), cert. den. 358 U.S. 840, 3 
L.Ed.2d 76, 79 S.C!. 66. 
8. 262 Cal. App.2d at 573, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 42. 
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charges a substantial fee for preparing himself to testify and 
for taking the stand. Nevertheless, California law takes the 
position that no matter who the witness is or how much he 
charges the party who calls him, all a party can collect in 
costs is the statutory per diem fee of $4 plus mileage. This 
is the rule generally applicable under section 733 of the Evi-
dence Code. It has been applied consistently in condemnation 
cases.9 
The majority decision circumvents this rule, but in so doing 
sets a precedent which is bound to cause confusion and may 
ultimately lead to serious injustice. For example, an honest 
but unsuccessful or partially successful litigant who sues 
multiple defendants in a single action may find himself charged 
with multiple travel and per diem fees for a large number 
of ordinary eyewitnesses each of whom testified for the de-
fendants. Presumably, each witness may demand the full 
amount of the fees even though this amount constitutes a sub-
stantial windfall. 
The court in the present case might have provided defend-
ants with the desired relief by deciding that the current cost 
provisions are unconstitutional when applied in condemnation 
actions. Apparently the point was not raised at the trial 
level. But a substantial argument can be made that "just 
compensation" requires payment for the full cost of an expert 
appraiser whenever his testimony is reasonably necessary. 
Most of the cases in point, and there are not many, are col-
lected in an annotation in 18 A.L.R. 2d 1229-30 (1951). 
Although some courts in other jurisdictions have held that 
their state constitutions require such payment, the California 
courts have not.10 In one of the most recent cases, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona relied on California decisions to reject a 
demand for such costs.l1 
9. City of Los Angeles v. Vickers, 81 
Cal. App. 737, 254 P. 687 (1927); Coun-
ty of Los Angeles v. Marblehead Land 
Co., 95 Cal. App. 799, 273 P. 138 
(1928); People v. Bowman, 173 Cal. 
App.2d 416, 343 P.2d 267 (1959); Frus-
tuck v. Fairfax, 230 Cal. App.2d 412, 
228 CAL LAW 1969 
416, 41 Cal. Rptr. 56, 59 (1964) (dic-
tum). 
10. See footnote 9, supra, for author-
ities. 
11. State v. MacDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 
352 P.2d 343 (1960). 
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In light of the Gonzales decision and the general confusion 
over cost policy, it seems appropriate for the State Bar to 
undertake a detailed study of the problem with an eye toward 
a new, clearly stated, unified cost statute to guide courts and 
lawyers in future litigation. 
Cause of Action-The Scope 
A court's definition of the scope of a cause of action for 
res judicata and other purposes depends upon which of two 
basic conflicting theories it accepts. The so-called "operative 
facts" theory defines a cause of action in terms of the defend-
ant's acts. All injuries suffered by a plaintiff due to a single 
transaction or occurrence or a related series of transactions 
or occurrences are held to fall within a single cause. If a de-
fendant negligently drives his automobile into plaintiff's house, 
causing him personal injury, as well as damage to personal 
and real property, plaintiff has but a single cause of action 
and must claim all of his damages at once. 
The so-called "primary right" theory defines a cause of 
action in terms of the nature of injuries suffered by the plain-
tiff. A plaintiff has a separate cause of action for an invasion 
of each of his "primary" rights, even if such invasions are 
caused by a single act or series of acts by defendant. There 
are separate primary rights for physical injury to person, 
injury to personalty, damage to realty, injury to character, 
etc. In the situation above where defendant negligently drives 
his vehicle into plaintiff's house, plaintiff has at least three 
separate causes of action which he could pursue separately in 
three cases. 
California courts have uniformly and consistently followed 
the primary right theory for over one hundred years.12 It is 
somewhat startling, therefore, to find the court in Holmes v. 
12. See Comment, Res Judicata in 
California, 40 Cal. L. Rev. 412 at 419 
(1952); 2 Witkin, Calif. Proc., Plead-
ing § 11 (1954); 1 Chadburn, Gross-
man & Van Alstyne, California Plead-
ing § 761 (1961); Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 
Cal.2d 891, 151 P.2d 846 (1944); Mc-
Nulty v. Copp, 125 Cal. App.2d 697, 
271 P.2d 90 (1954). 
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David H. Bricker, Inc. 13 holding that plaintiff was barred by res 
judicata from maintaining a suit for damage to his car be-
cause he had previously instituted a personal injury action 
based on the same facts of liability, against the same defend-
ant.14 The case is significant for three reasons: (1) it raises 
the question of whether California courts should adopt a new 
cause of action theory; (2) until confirmed or overruled by 
the supreme court or the legislature, the decision will cause 
considerable confusion and may prove to be a trap for unwary 
litigants; (3) for a case having such far reaching ramifications, 
the low quality of the opinion and the underlying research 
upon which it is based, are matters of serious concern. 
The relative values of the "operative facts" and "primary 
rights" theories have been hotly debated and discussed in many 
articles and cases.15 The advantage of the operative facts 
theory is its tendency to cut down litigation by requiring all 
relevant facts to be tried in a single action for the convenience 
of the court, parties, and witnesses. This apparent advantage 
is lessened somewhat by the fact that under the primary right 
theory the principles of collateral estoppel limit the efficacy 
of bringing separate actions based upon a single set of facts. 
And there may be a decided advantage in allowing separate 
suits in certain types of cases. For example, when a plaintiff 
who has been seriously injured in an automobile collision must 
wait for nearly two years before obtaining a trial by jury, 
there seems little reason why he should not be permitted to 
bring a separate action in small claims court to recover im-
mediately for the damages to his automobile. Although small 
claims actions do have res judicata effect to bar future suits 
on the same cause of action, they do not have collateral es-
toppel effect; thus, under the primary right theory the per-
13. 265 A.C.A. 695, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
562 (1968) hearing granted ~ovember 
7, 1968. 
14. The personal injury action previ-
ously filed had no collateral estoppel 
effect since the issues were never liti-
gated. 
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15. See, for example, Harris, What 
is a Cause of Action? 16 Cal. L. Rev. 
459 (1928); Comment, Res Judicata ill 
California, 40 Cal. L. Rev. 412, 415-19 
(1952); 1 Stanford Law Rev. 156 
(1948); 2 Witkin, Calif. Proc., Pleading 
§ 11, pp. 984-86 (1954). 
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sonal injury suit could in no way be affected by the small 
claims court decision .16 
Perhaps the deciding factor should be whether or not op-
eration of the law under the primary right theory has caused 
sufficient difficulty to justify the confusion and uncertainty 
that would surely result from a switch to the operative facts 
theory. There is a strong argument that even if such a change 
is justified, the legislature, and not the courts, should make 
it. Then the new law would take effect prospectively only, 
and unsuspecting plaintiffs, such as the one before the court in 
Holmes, would not suddenly find themselves barred by past 
actions. 
If the Holmes case properly declares the law, unwary in-
dividuals who, for one reason or another, filed and collected 
in separate actions for property damages, will lose their rights 
to later recover for serious personal injuries. This seems an 
intolerable price to pay for the advantages of the new rule. 
Even assuming that the advantages of a change in the law 
justify court action, such an important decision should be made 
only in an opinion which clearly notes the significance of the 
change and which affords it maximum pUblicity. Moreover, 
the court should carefully research the case and discuss all the 
relevant authority with precision so that the scope and impact 
of the case will not be misinterpreted. Unfortunately, the 
opinion in Holmes falls far short of these goals. Reliance was 
placed primarily on a 1957 annotation in American Law Re-
ports17 which merely states that the majority rule in the United 
States is that there is but one cause of action for personal in-
jury and property damage arising from the same tortious act. 
California cases are cited to support both the majority and the 
converse minority rule, although the most recent cases are 
claimed to support the majority position. 
The court in Holmes failed to discuss the historical dis-
tinction between the operative facts and primary right theories 
of a cause of action. Had it done so, it would have found 
that the A.L.R. annotation clearly rniscited the so-called 
16. Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal. 
2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941). 
17. 62 A.L.R.2d at 977. 
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"majority" cases. In each of these cases, Kidd v. Hillman,ts 
and Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield/9 as well as in 
a third case cited by the court as giving additional support, 
Pacific Indemnity Group v. Dunton,20 plaintiffs in an original 
suit had sought damages for personal injuries and damages to 
personal property. In the second suit brought by plaintiff's 
insurer as subrogee, the claim was again for damages to per-
sonal property, but the items of personalty involved were dif-
ferent from those involved in the first action. In two of these 
cases, Kidd and Dunton, the court held that the rules of res 
judicata prohibited maintenance of the second action since 
the first suit had already been brought for both personal in-
jury and property damage. In the third case, Winfield, it was 
held that the defense of res judicata had been waived.1 
By asking for damages due to injury to their personal prop-
erty, plaintiffs in each of the above actions shut off the right 
to claim damages to personalty in the later suits. When 
a defendant's act causes damage to several items of personal 
property, it is clear that a plaintiff has but one cause of action 
regarding the primary right as to his personalty no matter what 
kind of items are involved.2 He cannot sue separately with 
respect to each separate item damaged, any more than a 
plaintiff should be permitted to sue separately for each sepa-
rate bruise he received in a single accident. The holdings in 
these cases are clearly correct, but they can in no way support 
the court's proposition that had plaintiffs sought only personal 
injury damages in the first actions, they would have been 
barred in the second suits from pursuing remedies for prop-
erty damage. 
In addition to misreading those cases alleged to support its 
decisions, the court in Holmes failed to deal with those authori-
18. 14 Cal. App.2d 507, 58 P.2d 662 
(1936). 
19. 24 Cal. App.2d 477, 75 P.2d 525 
(1938). 
20. 243 Cal. App.2d 504, 52 Cal. 
Rptr. 332 (1966). 
1. It should be noted that the court 
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in Holmes, at page 699, miscited both 
the holding and the rationale of the 
Winfield decision. 
2. See Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 
Cal.2d at 572, 110 P.2d at 1029, dis-
cussing the Kidd case; cf. Beronio v. 
Southern Pacific R.R., 86 Cal. 415, 24 
P. 1093 (1890). 
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ties taking a contrary position.3 For example, the court 
made no mention whatsoever of the history of section 427 
of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant cases under it, 
despite the fact that they constitute the most direct authority 
on the point in question.4 Prior to 1907, section 427 prohih-
ited a plaintiff from joining a claim for personal injury with 
a claim for damage to property. Thus in Lamh v. Harhaugh,5 
in which defendant allegedly broke into plaintiff's home caus-
ing injuries to character, to health and to property, the court 
specifically held that each of the listed injuries involved a 
separate cause of action which could not be claimed in a 
single lawsuit. 
In a 1912 decision, Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R.,6 
which is closely analogous to Holmes, plaintiff was permitted 
to collect for personal injuries from an auto accident in spite 
of a prior action in which he had sued for and collected 
damages to his automobile. The court rejected the argument 
that plaintiff had split a single cause of action, pointing out 
that under section 427 plaintiff was not even permitted to 
join claims for the two types of injury. The court in Schermer-
horn failed to note or comment upon a 1907 amendment 
to section 427, which on its face permitted a plaintiff to join 
all causes of action arising from a single transaction or 
occurrence. Perhaps in response to the uncertainty caused 
by the apparent conflict between the statute and the statement 
in the case, the legislature in 1915 again amended section 
427 specifically providing that "causes of action for injuries 
to person and injuries to property, growing out of the same 
tort, may be joined in the same complaint." (Emphasis 
added.) There seems little doubt, at least from a historical 
point of view, that both the legislature and the courts have 
taken the position that injuries to person and property con-
stitute separate causes of action under California law which 
mayor may not be joined at plaintiff's option. 
3. The court confined itself to refut-
ing several of plaintiff's citations which, 
as the court quite correctly analyzed, 
were generally irrelevant. 
4. § 427 of Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. 
is the section entitled, "Joinder of 
causes of action." 
5. 105 Cal. 680, 39 P. 56 (1895). 
6. 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351 
(1912). 
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The court in Holmes, as its final point, contended that even 
if one finds that injury to person and property constitute two 
separate causes of action, a failure to join both types of relief 
in a single action will result in a res judicata disposition. The 
court argued that such a position is justified by the strong 
policy against piecemeal litigation and cited the compulsory 
counterclaim provision, section 439, as authority for its posi-
tion. The weakness of this argument is readily apparent upon 
consideration of section 442, the California cross-complaint 
statute. Any action of defendant against plaintiff arising 
out of the same transaction as plaintiff's action qualifies as 
a cross-complaint under section 442. But unless such a 
claim also meets the requirements of the counterclaim statute, 
section 438, the compulsory provisions of section 439 do not 
apply. Had the legislature intended that all actions arising 
from a single transaction be brought in a single lawsuit, it 
certainly would have extended section 439 to cover all cross-
complaints by defendants against plaintiffs. Surely, section 
439 in its present form cannot be read to imply the drastic 
change in the law for which it is cited in the Holmes decision. 
It can only be hoped that in the near future an authoritative, 
well reasoned decision will clarify the confusion, uncertainty, 
and potential harm of the Holmes case. 
Collateral Estoppel-Effect of Settlement Before Trial 
The decision of the court in Artucovich v. Arizmendiz7 
raises an important question as to the propriety of affording 
collateral estoppel effect to issues in an action which is settled 
by the litigants prior to trial. Plaintiff, Juan Artucovich, 
sought damages for personal injuries received when the car 
he was driving collided with another vehicle owned by defend-
ant, Michael Arizmendiz and driven by the defendant's wife 
Cecilia, who was alleged to have been negligent. 
Defendant successfully moved for a summary judgment on 
the basis of the disposition of a prior personal injury action 
brought by Cecilia against Artucovich, involving the same 
7. 256 Cal. App.2d 130, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 8[0 (1967). 
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collision, in which it had been alleged that Artucovich was 
negligent. Before trial this first action had been dismissed 
with prejudice by plaintiff Cecilia after a settlement agreement 
under which Artucovich paid her $500. 
Two arguments were successfully advanced on appeal in 
the second case in support of the summary judgment below. 
First, it was asserted that plaintiff, by failing to counterclaim 
for his injuries against Cecilia in the first action, had lost his 
right to claim such damages in any later action, and, second, 
it was claimed that the dismissal of the first suit necessarily 
determined that Cecilia was not negligent. Since Michael 
Arizmendiz's liability was based solely on a statuteS making 
an owner liable for the negligence of a permittee driver, a 
finding that Cecilia was not negligent would completely exon-
erate her husband. 
The argument that plaintiff's failure to counterclaim in the 
first action barred his present suit cannot be supported. It 
is true that under section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
a defendant who fails to file against a plaintiff a counterclaim 
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plain-
tiff's claim will be barred from later instituting that claim as 
an independent action. But the court failed to recognize 
that section 439 applies only to counterclaims and not to cross-
complaints. Under section 438 a counterclaim is defined as 
an action by a defendant against a plaintiff. A counterclaim 
cannot be brought against a third party. Thus, the only way 
Artucovich could have sued Michael Arizmendiz in the first 
action was by way of cross-complaint under section 442. 
There is no provision for a compulsory cross-complaint. 
The second ground for upholding the summary judgment 
is equally insubstantial. The court of appeals, which stated 
that the first suit "adjudicated" the fact that Artucovich was 
not negligent, made a totally unwarranted assumption that a 
dismissal based upon a compromise is tantamount to a factual 
determination which can be given collateral estoppel effect. 
It is manifestly against the policy of California law to permit 
8. Cal. Vehicle Code § 17150. 
CAL LAW 1969 235 
45
Friedenthal: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Civil Procedure 
the use of settlements or settlement negotiations against a 
party except with respect to an action upon the settlement 
itself. One example of this policy is contained in section 997, 
which provides a method whereby a defendant may make a 
formal offer to compromise a plaintiff's claim. A 1967 
amendment makes clear that a judgment based upon accept-
ance of such an offer cannot be used for subsequent litigation.9 
If a formal settlement under the code cannot result in a judg-
ment having collateral estoppel effect, surely an ordinary com-
promise agreement leading to a dismissal should not have such 
effect. The policy is further supported by a provision of the 
Evidence Code, which specifically makes a compromise in 
one case inadmissible in evidence in other litigation. to 
There are two basic reasons underlying the policy against 
giving collateral estoppel effect to compromise judgments.ll 
First, as a general matter, out-of-court settlements are strongly 
favored. If a judgment based on a compromise gives rise 
to possible unforeseen effects detrimental to the parties, such 
settlements will be discouraged. The danger of such unfore-
seen effects has already substantially increased because of re-
cent decisions which have extended collateral estoppel prin-
ciples to cover persons not parties to the action. U Second, 
it is unjustifiable to assume that payment by one party in a 
settlement of a claim constitutes an admission, let alone an 
"adjudication," of issues constituting liability. A defendant 
may agree to pay a small sum merely because it would cost 
much more to fight the suit to a successful conclusion. In 
auto cases insurance companies are often in complete charge 
of the defense. Within the monetary limits of a policy, a 
company has virtual autonomy in deciding on a settlement on 
behalf of the defendant whom it has insured. Rarely does 
the company have any direct interest in any later action which 
its insured might himself wish to bring. 
9. See Witkin, California Proc. 1967 pel effect to compromise judgments, see 
Suppl., Judgment § 66A. 108 U.Pa.L.Rev. 173 (1959). 
10. Cal. Evid. Code § 1152. 12. See CAL LAW TRENDS AND DE-
ll. For a general discussion of the VELOPMENTS 1967, Civil Procedure, be-
reasons against giving collateral estop- ginning at page 250. 
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the present case is 
that it follows on the heels of another recent case which made 
a similar decision. Although the court in the present case 
failed to cite it, the opinion in Louie Queriolo Trucking Inc. v. 
Superior Coud3 is closely analagous. In that action plaintiff 
vehicle owner was permitted to recover for the damages to his 
vehicle on the basis of facts "established" in a prior suit 
brought by the driver of the vehicle against the same defend-
ant. The case received considerable attention for allowing 
a plaintiff to use recovery by another person in a prior suit 
"offensively" to establish his own right to recover. 14 One 
important aspect of this case has received no special mention, 
however. In the first suit, after the driver had won a jury 
verdict and while defendant's appeal was pending, the parties 
agreed to a compromise. The appellate court in the second 
action assumed without comment that the settlement must have 
been in favor of the driver who won below and that it estab-
lished the truth of his claims. It was on the basis of these 
assumptions that the plaintiff in the second suit was allowed 
to prevail. The case is somewhat distinguishable from the 
present case in that there had been a jury decision, but this 
difference was substantially weakened because the opinion 
clearly treats the jury decision as having been nullified by the 
decision to compromise. 
The decisions in Artucovich and Louie Queriolo Trucking 
Inc. should be disapproved as soon as possible, before they 
begin an undesirable trend in the law. At the same time, it 
should be made clear that if a litigant wants a compromise 
decision to have effect beyond the present action, he may 
accomplish this by including appropriate provisions in the 
settlement agreement. 
Proper protection for all parties could have resulted if 
Michael Arizmendiz had been made a party to the settlement 
agreement between his wife and plaintiff. Without such pro-
tection, a driver in Cecilia's position often could lose the 
13. 252 Cal. App.2d 194, 60 Cal. case, see CAL LAW TRENDS AND DE-
Rptr. 389 (1967). VELOPMENTS 1967, Civil Procedure, 
14. For a further discussion of this page 250. 
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value of her settlement, for if a plaintiff is successful against 
a car owner, in many cases the owner can in turn sue the 
driver for indemnity. 
Availability of Appeal in Small Claims Court 
Section 117j of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that a defendant may appeal from a small claims court judg-
ment. The appeal is to the superior court and results in a 
trial de novo in that court. In Skaff v. Small Claims Court for 
the Los Angeles Judicial District/5 the California Supreme 
Court faced the question whether or not section 117j 
applies to a plaintiff with respect to a counterclaim filed 
against him in his small claims action. 
Plaintiff in Skaff brought suit to collect $250, the amount 
of a deposit made on a rented automobile. Defendant coun-
terclaimed for $175 which was allegedly due from the plaintiff 
on an entirely different transaction. The court held for de-
fendant on both the claim and counterclaim. The plaintiff 
attempted to appeal the judgment on the counterclaim to the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which refused to hear 
the case. The supreme court held that the plaintiff should 
be treated as a defendant with regard to the counterclaim and 
was thus entitled to appeal. 
The court had to base its holding solely on considerations 
of policy since it recognized that the language of section 117 j 
itself is ambiguous. The opinion listed four reasons for 
the decision. First, "[s]ince decisions of this court character-
ize a counterclaim as a separate, simultaneous action, the 
plaintiff in the original action becomes a defendant in the 
cross-action and acquires the appellate remedies of a defend-
ant.,,16 The court supported this statement merely by citing 
two otherwise unrelated cases, ostensibly for the proposition 
that, regardless of context, any cross-action should necessarily 
be treated as separate and distinct from the original claim.17 
15. 68 Cal.2d 76, 65 Cal. Rptr. 65, 16. 68 Cal.2d at 78, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 
435 P.2d 825 (1968). 66, 435 P.2d at 826. 
17. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Superior 
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Neither of the two cases in any way supports such a broad 
proposition. ls Obviously, such a broad view is unjustified. 
One must look to the underlying nature and purpose of the 
matter in question to determine the extent to which such 
separate treatment makes sense. 
The second ground of the court's decision was that the 
under1ying reasons supporting the denial of an appeal to a 
plaintiff in his original action do not apply to a counterclaim. 
The court pointed out that for his own claim plaintiff could 
have chosen to go either to municipal or small claims court, 
and that by electing the latter, with its inexpensive, informal 
procedure, he voluntarily agreed to be bound by the decision 
without further recourse. On the other hand, the court argued 
that with respect to the counterclaim plaintiff was not volun-
tarily in small claims court but was there involuntarily, just 
as if he were a defendant; thus he should not be held to have 
waived any of the rights to which a defendant is entitled. 
The court's second argument is also weak, for it ignores 
the basic purpose of permitting defendants to demand a de 
novo tria1. The small claims procedure is a highly desirable 
method of solving minor disputes, and no ordinary type of 
appeal is warranted. Given the size of the disputes involved, 
Court, 219 Cal. 179, 25 P.2d 983, 90 
A.L.R. 384 (1933); Case v. Kadota Fig 
Ass'n., 35 Cal.2d 596, 220 P.2d 912 
(1950). 
18. The court's citation of cases is 
subject to severe criticism. The first 
case, Pacific Finance Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 219 Cal. 179, 25 P.2d 983, 90 
A.L.R. 384 (1933), involved a cross-
complaint as opposed to a counterclaim. 
While a cross-complaint has always 
been treated as a separate action by the 
California courts, a counterclaim has 
generally been treated as a defense to 
the plaintiff's action and not separate at 
all. This principle is dramatically il-
lustrated by the second case cited in the 
Skaff opinion, Case v. Kadota Fig 
Ass'n., 35 Ca1.2d 596, 220 P.2d 912 
(1950). Here the court was involved 
with a purported cross-complaint which 
had been brought by an association, the 
defendant in the original claim. At 
that time an unincorporated association 
was unable to sue in its own name; 
since a cross-complaint was treated as 
a separate action, it was held that no 
cross-complaint could be brought. How-
ever, and this the court in Skaff over-
looked, the Kadota Fig case went on to 
hold that the defendant's claim would 
qualify as a counterclaim and as such 
could be maintained. The court could 
have cited Tomales Bay Oyster Corp. 
v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 389, 217 
P.2d 968 (1950), which held for the pur-
pose there involved, again totally irrele-
vant to the present case, that a counter-
claim should be considered as a separate 
action. 
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the costs of such appeals to the litigants and to the court 
is too great a price to pay. But since a defendant in small 
claims court is denied his rights to counsel and trial by jury, 
the entire small claims procedure is unconstitutional unless 
defendant has the power to request a de novo trial where those 
rights can be exercised. However, there is no justification 
for extending such reasoning to a plaintiff who has volun-
tarily entered small claims court under a statute which pro-
vides that a counterclaim may be filed against him. Once he 
selects the small claims forum, it is not unreasonable to say 
that by so doing he agrees to accept its decision on any valid 
counterclaim against him as well as his own claim. This is 
particularly so because to be tried in small claims court, the 
counterclaim must itself fall within the court's jurisdictional 
limitations.19 Since plaintiff waived his constitutional rights 
to counsel and trial by jury by entering small claims court, 
he should not be given the right to demand a trial de novo. 
The third reason for the court's decision was that denial of 
an appeal by plaintiff for the counterclaim would tend to dis-
courage the use of the small claims court. The court said, 
"Non appealability of the counterclaim would expose the mov-
ing party to the possibility of the conversion of his claim into 
a quite unexpected adverse judgment which he could neither 
discharge, because he lacks the funds, nor challenge on ap-
peal."~o This argument ignores the realities of small claims 
litigation. A poor plaintiff, already in court, would probably 
rather have defendant's counterclaim brought against him in 
small claims court than face the possibility of a separate action 
in a municipal court at another time. Also, to a poor plaintiff, 
the right to a trial de novo is hardly attractive. Such a trial 
is held in superior court, where the normal rules of evidence 
apply; witnesses must be formally called and cross-examined; 
a full range of trial and post-trial motions are available; and 
a jury may be demanded. Representation by counsel is a 
practical necessity. Yet the $15 statutory amount which a 
winning litigant is permitted to recover for counsel fees hardly 
19. Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 117h. 20. 68 Cal.2d at 79, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 
68, 435 P.2d at 827. 
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suffices to cover his actual outlay.l From a practical point of 
view it seems most unlikely that the Skaff decision will encour-
age poor plaintiffs, heretofore reluctant to press their cases, 
to file in small claims courts. The number of situations would 
seem few indeed where persons have decided to forego suit 
altogether or to select a municipal court, merely because a 
counterclaim might be filed against them-and might be lost 
under circumstances where an appeal might prove worthwhile. 
On the other hand, the Skaff decision will tend to strengthen 
the hand of the wealthy, powerful litigant who utilizes the 
small claims court against poor defendants. An affluent plain-
tiff will welcome a counterclaim by such a defendant; for it 
will provide him the additional advantage of threatening an 
expensive and lengthy trial de novo in order to obtain a 
favorable settlement on the entire case. 
In a note on the California small claims court in 52 Cal. 
Law Review 876 (1964), the authors did an empirical study 
of some 386 cases in the Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville Judi-
cial District. Their study revealed that most plaintiffs in 
small claims courts are businesses and governmental agen-
cies; they filed some 60% of the cases. Of the remaining 
cases, mostly filed by individuals, undoubtedly a significant 
portion were brought by landlords against their tenants. On 
the other hand, only 15 % of defendants in small claims courts 
are not individuals. The result of the current case will tend 
to discourage individual defendants from bringing counter-
claims in those cases where it would be most desirable for 
them to do so. For example, when a business brings suit 
on a conditional sales contract, defendant buyer will now 
hesitate before counterclaiming for a defect in the goods 
purchased. He will know that even if he is successful, the 
plaintiff will be likely to demand a de novo trial. In many 
cases a business will utilize counsel already on retainer so 
the added cost to it will be infinitesimal, whereas defendant 
may have neither money, time, nor energy to safeguard his 
rights. 
The court's fourth reason for its decision is that the recogni-
1. Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 117j. 
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tion of plaintiff's right of appeal on a counterclaim avoids 
a ruling which would pivot that right upon the fortuity of 
the way in which the claim is presented. In other words, if 
the defendant had brought his claim as a separate action, 
plaintiff could appeal; thus, the court reasons, plaintiff should 
be allowed to appeal when defendant's claim is asserted in a 
counterclaim. In taking this position the court once again 
ignores the substantial advantages of the small claims proce-
dure and the underlying justifications for allowing defendant 
an appeal. The de novo trial on appeal is a time-consuming 
and wasteful maneuver, requiring a superior court judge to 
sit on a matter of trivial moment; it should be permitted only 
when the constitution so demands. 
One other issue worthy of discussion was touched upon 
by the court. The court seemed to assume that if a claim 
and counterclaim are not treated as entirely separate for pur-
poses of appeal, then defendant might not be treated as a 
plaintiff with regard to his own counterclaim. This means 
that defendant presumably would be allowed to appeal from 
an adverse decision on the counterclaim as well as from the 
decision on the claim. Obviously this is not a sound result. 
If a defendant files a counterclaim he should be bound by the 
result just as if he were the plaintiff. Thus, section 117j 
should be read within the policy and meaning of the statute 
as follows: when a party brings an action affirmatively, 
whether by claim or by counterclaim, he should be treated 
as a plaintiff and barred from appealing an adverse decision 
on any aspect of the case. Having subjected himself to the 
tribunal voluntarily, he should be required to abide by the 
decision of that tribunal without appeal. As already stated, 
the appeal provided in section 117j should be applied only 
to prevent the small claims procedure from being an uncon-
stitutional restriction on defendants in cases where only a 
claim is filed. The above rule cannot be applied, however, 
where defendant's counterclaim is compulsory under section 
439. 2 Section 117h states that the normal counterclaim 
2. In the only case dealing with the Cal. App.2d Suppl. 825 at 827, 334 
point, Thompson v. Chew Quan, 167 P.2d 1074 at 1075-1076 (1959), the 
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rules apply in small claims court when the counterclaims fall 
within small claims jurisdiction. This would seem to mean 
that, as to such counterclaims, the provisions of section 439 
are applicable. If the party bringing such a counterclaim 
does not approve of the small claims court decision on it, it 
seems clear that he must be free to appeal to the superior 
court and obtain a trial de novo. Otherwise, denial to him 
of an attorney and a right to trial by jury would be uncon-
stitutional. His bringing a compulsory counterclaim can in no 
way be considered a waiver. It makes little sense, of course, 
to make counterclaims mandatory in small claims court. Since 
defendant may always obtain a trial de novo on such a coun-
terclaim, he might as well have the option, at the outset, 
where to file the action. If, under the small claims statute, 
it were to be made clear that a counterclaim is not compulsory 
and thus need not be filed, a defendant who did voluntarily 
file in small claims court could then be held to have waived his 
right to appeal. 
In the light of the Skaff decision and the general compul-
sory counterclaim problem in the small claims court, it would 
be wise for the legislature, once again, to revise the small 
claims court provisions. It should do so simply by stating 
that any party who seeks affirmative relief by way of either 
claim or counterclaim waives his right to appeal, and accepts 
the decision as final on both claims and counterclaims. The 
compulsory counterclaim statute should be deemed in-
applicable. 
court held that a counterclaim in ex-
cess of the jurisdictional limits of the 
small claims court was not compulsory 
under § 439 even though arising out of 
the same action as the original claim. 
It left open the question whether any 
counterclaim was mandatory, although 
indicating that some are by virtue of 
§ 117h. 
An argument can be made that the 
general language of § 117h should not 
* 
be read to encompass compulsory 
counterclaims. The Supreme Court of 
California in Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 
Cal.2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941), held 
that the rules of collateral estoppel do 
not apply to the decisions of small 
claims courts because of that court's 
special character. Similar reasoning 
may also be used to support the inap-
plicability of § 439 of the Cal. Code of 
Civ. Pro. 
CAL LAW 1969 243 
53
Friedenthal: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
